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The current emphasis  on poverty and on meeting basic human needs  is  a
logical next step in the evolution of development thinking that offers
several  fundamental advantages compared to  the previous approaches
focusing on growth, employment, and income redistribution.
John Sewell  (1981)1
... the emphasis  today is  on the Soviet problem.  It  is because it is
indeed this problem that puts  the broader and the longlasting universal
aspirations of the American people first to world peace and secondly for
the realization that the basic human values which this nation stands for
in jeopardy.  These are values which are embodied in our constitution and
which we hope to  see broadened internationally among states who have been
less blessed than ourselves.
Alexander Haig  (1981)2
Foreign assistance in the United States has been subjected to many
diverse and, at times,  conflicting objectives.  They have ranged from
meeting U.S. security and economic needs  to  enhancing the economic and
political development of developing countries.  The means employed to
reach these objectives have been equally diverse:  the Marshall Plan, the
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age, or veteran status.technical and institutional programs of the 1940s  and 1950s,  and the more
growth-oriented projects of the  1960s.  In short, strategies reflect
changes  in the global political and economic environment, and in U.S.
politics.
The  1973 Foreign Assistance Act  (referred to  as the Basic Human Needs
Mandate  [BHN]  or New Directions),  redirected U.S. development assistance
strategy to  the poorest, mostly rural people of the developing world.  BHN
was hailed initially as a "significant departure" from the growth-centered
assistance of the 1960s and concentrated on food production, rural
development, nutrition, population planning, health and education.3
Unfortunately, the mandate turned out to  consist of more rhetoric  than
deeds.  For example, although BHN was  "enshrined"4  in policy in 1978 when
Congress declared the principal purpose of U.S. bilateral assistance  to be
to support equitable growth and to  enable the poor majority  to "satisfy
their basic needs and lead lives of decency, dignity, and hope," 5  the
Carter administration and the Congress soon began to reallocate resources
away from BHN to more U.S. security-dominated interests;  and they regarded
with skepticism the value to  the United States of multilateral  development
assistance.  Thus there was initiated a dramatic shift to bilateral
economic and security assistance.
The two Reagan administrations used this security emphasis  to  swell
foreign assistance appropriations for their purposes.  Nevertheless, by
1986,  the growth of the federal budget deficit emboldened the Congress  to
become  less obliging.  The foreign assistance program became a political
quagmire.  Since then, assistance appropriations have been scaled down.Economic development may dominate the  rhetoric of foreign assistance
but  its  implementation reflects a rivalry between the administration and
Congress.  Each promotes  a different agenda in the search for a feasible
policy.  To understand the reality and the  rhetoric of the U.S. assistance
program since  the inception of BHN it  is necessary, consequently, to
identify the underlying determinants of the U.S. policy.  This paper
examines these  sources.
As a start,  let's examine the budgetary trends of  the years  1978-1989
and their origins:  and continue with the presidential administrations;  the
United States Agency for International Development  (USAID); the Congress;
external and societal  influences;  and intellectual institutions and
writings.
Trends in Foreign Assistance
By reviewing specific allocations of U.S. foreign assistance,
administration priorities can be  identified for the various programs
and/or initiatives  (see Tables 1-5).6  The foreign assistance  trends are
especially revealing for the Carter and subsequent Reagan administrations
because of the clear contrast between administrative rhetoric and actual
aid disbursements.  The rhetoric stressed BHN, economic development based
on free markets, and democratic capitalism.  The disbursements, however,
emphasized U.S. national security interests and assistance to political
allies.  These trends are  illustrated in the foreign assistance accounts
(USAID functional accounts, Economic Support Fund  [ESF],  multilateral
assistance, etc.),  the geographic areas where funds were disbursed, and
the budget process.U.S. Foreign Economic and Financial Assistance
Annual Budget Authority, 1978-1989
(Functional Code  150;  in billions  of current dollars)
Carter  First Reagan  Second Reagan
Administration  Administration  Administration
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  19 8 881 98 9g
Development
Assistancea  1.3  1.7  2.0  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.3  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.1
Food  Aidb  1.1  1.3  1.5  1.6  1.4  1.4  1.6  2.2  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.4
Multilateral
Assistancec  2.2  2.8  2.5  1.3  1.5  1.8  1.6  1.7  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5
ESF
d   2.2  2.3  2.0  2.1  2.9  3.0  3.3  6.1
1   3.8  3.6  3.2  3.3
Total
Economic
Assistancee  6.8  8 . 1h  8.0  6.9  7.8  8.2  8.5  12.3
i   9.0  8.7  8.2  8.3
Military
Assistance
f   2.4  6 .6h  2.1  3.2  4.1  5.5  6.5  5.8  5.8  5.0  5.2  5.7
Total  9.2  1 4 .7h 1 0 .1  10.1  11.9  13.7  15.0  18.1
1   14.8  13.7  13.4  14.0
a. Bilateral USAID  functional accounts, miscellaneous programs  (i.e.,  disaster
relief),  Peace Corps, International Narcotics Control, refugee assistance,  other
miscellaneous economic  assistance (Sahel Development Program, the Development Fund  for
Africa).
b. PL480  Program, Titles  I and II.
c. Contributions  to the multilateral development banks  (i.e.,  World Bank,
International Development Association) and international organizations  and programs
(i.e.,  United Nations)
d. Replaced security supporting assistance  in the  International Security Assistance
Act of 1978.  Includes monies  for large projects,  commodity import  financing and cash
grants.
e. Assistance given to bolster economies  of recipient countries: not considered
military assistance.
f. International  Security Assistance: Military Assistance Program  (MAP), foreign
military sales  (FMS) credits,  military training  (IMET).
g. Estimated.
h. Includes  $4.8 billion  economic and military aid package to the Middle East.
i. Includes  $1.1 billion  emergency economic aid transfer to  Israel, Egypt, and
Jordan.
Source:  Budget of the United States  Government, various  issues, FY 1980-89, Produced by
the  Office  of Management  and  Budget  (Washington D.C.:  GPO).
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TABLE  1Program Trends  Table 1 presents the trends in the flow of foreign
assistance since 1978.  The year 1978 was chosen as  the base because it
was the first foreign assistance budget prepared by the Carter
administration.
For purposes of this study, development assistance refers to  the
direct transfer of funds  from the United States to a recipient country;
and it  is  considered bilateral (as opposed to  multilateral) assistance,
placing emphasis on long-term development and humanitarian concerns.
PL480--Public Law 480/Food for Peace--provides food aid through
bilateral assistance.  The U.S. government offers concessional, long-term
financing for the commercial sale of U.S. agricultural commodities under
Title  I and Title III  (the latter is  the Food for Development Program),
and through grants  (Title II)  to meet emergency and humanitarian needs;  it
includes economic and community development  in recipient countries.  The
authority for Title I and Title II programs  is  included in Table 1. 7
The Economic  Support Fund  (ESF), also bilateral assistance,  is mostly
used to  provide security assistance.  It replaced Security Supporting
Assistance by the International Security Assistance Act of  1978  to  assist
countries that have special economic, political, or military significance
for the United States.  ESF is a very flexible account and allots funds  in
the form of project support, commodity import financing, or cash grants. 8
Multilateral assistance includes  the budget for Multilateral
Development Banks  (MDBs) and International Organizations  (i.e.,  UNICEF,
United Nations Development Program, and Organization for American States).
Its  assistance is  directed to  development.The assistance trends  in the Carter budgets emphasize bilateral
assistance, development assistance, and food aid;  a sharp decline in
multilateral assistance;  and relatively stagnant ESF authority.
During the first Reagan administration, ESF funding shows substantial
increases whereas other bilateral economic assistance programs increased
only slightly, and multilateral assistance  funding decreased and became
virtually stagnant at its lowest level since  1981.  The overall budget for
economic assistance grew by 20 percent.  During the  second Reagan
administration, a downward trend occurred in overall budget authority with
drastic cuts  in the ESF account--the favored budget during the first
administration.
The trend in military assistance also is  shown in Table 1 to
illustrate  the linkage of economic, security, and military assistance.
The large build up of military assistance during the first Reagan
administration coincided with increased ESF authority.  Military
assistance continued to be high during the second Reagan administration.
Table 2 shows the foreign assistance authority for  the same period of
1978-1989.  The dollar amounts have been deflated to reflect constant 1982
dollars  to make the appropriation trends clear.  Thus  the table makes
evident that during the second Reagan administration sizable declines
occurred in development assistance, food aid, and multilateral assistance
whereas  funding for ESF peaked in 1985 and then started the decline  that
still is in effect.  The budget authority for foreign economic assistance,
in real terms,  clearly declined by almost 30 percent between 1978 and 1989
whereas  the authority for military assistance increased by almost 40
percent.U.S. Foreign Economic  and Financial Assistance
Annual Budget Authority, 1978-1989
(Functional Code  150;  in billions of  constant 1982  dollars)
Carter
Administration
1978  1979  1980  1981
First Reagan
Administration
1982  1983  1984  1985
Second Reagan
Administration













1.8  2.2  2.3  2.0  2.0
1.5  1.6  1.8  1.7  1.4
1.9  1.9  2.1
1.3  1.5  2.0
3.0  3.6  2.9  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.5  1.5
3.0  2.9  2.3  2.2  2.9  2.9  3.1  5.5c
9.3  10.3  9.3  7.3  7.8  7.8  8.0  1 1.1c
3.3  8.4b 2.5  3.4
12.6  18 .7b 1 1 . 8 10.7
4.1  5.3  6.0  5.2





1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2
3.3  3.1  2.7  2.7
7.8  7.4  6.9  6.7
5.1  4.3  4.3  4.6
12.9  11.7  11.2  11.3
a.  Estimated.
b. Includes $6.1 billion  (in constant 1982  dollars) economic and military aid
package  to  the  Middle  East.
c. Includes $1.0  billion  (in constant 1982  dollars) emergency economic aid  transfer
to  Israel,  Egypt  and  Jordan.
Source:  Budget of  the United States  Government, various  issues,  FY  1980-89, Produced by
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  (Washington  D.C.:  GPO).
To  further  illustrate  the  priorities  of  the  Carter  and  Reagan
administrations,  Table  3  compares  the  budget  components  of  the  economic
assistance  category  as  a  percentage  of  total  assistance.  Opposing  trends
show  up  for  development  assistance,  multilateral  assistance  and  ESF.  The
40 percent funding level for ESF was attained mainly at the expense of
funds for multilateral assistance.
TABLE  2TABLE  3  U.S Foreign Economic  and Financial Assistance
(Program  as  a  percentage  of  Total Economic Assistance)
Carter  First Reagan  Second Reagan
Administration  Administration  Administration
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985b  1986  1987  1988a1989
a
Development
Assistance  19.2  21.0 25.0 27.5  25.6 24.4 23.5  18.7  23.3 25.3 26.8 25.3
Food  Aid  16.2  16.0  18.2  23.3  18.0  17.1  18.8  17.9  18.9  17.2  17.1  16.9
Multilateral
Assistance  33.3  34.6  31.2  18.8  19.2  21.9  18.8  13.8  15.6  16.1  17.1  18.1
ESF  32.3  28.4  25.0  30.4  37.2  36.6  38.9  49.6  42.2  41.4  39.0  39.7
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
a.  Estimated.
b.  Includes  $1.1  billion  emergency  economic  aid  transfer  to  Israel,  Egypt,  and
Jordan.
Source:  Budget  of the United States Government, various  issues, FY 1980-89, Produced by
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (Washington  D.C.:  GPO).
Geographic Trends.  Because political and strategic  importance is
often  dictated  by  geographic  region,  the  geographic  allocations  of  U.S.
foreign assistance also illustrate the concerns of administrations.  By
determining  the  amount  of  assistance  to  a  specific  country  or  region,
judgments  can  be  made  on  priorities  and  objectives.
Tables  4  and  5  show  that  the  Near  East  consistently  received  the
largest  share  of  assistance  and  that  assistance  to  Latin  America  doubled
in  real  terms  from  1978  to  1989.  Assistance  to  Africa  fluctuated  by  0.1
or,  at most,  0.2  billion,  in  keeping  with  the  trend  of  the  overall  foreign
assistance  budget,  but assistance  to  Asia  (and  the  other  components  of  the
category)  steadily  declined.
8TABLE 4  U.S Foreign  Economic and Financial Assistance
(Economic Assistance in billions of  constant 1982  dollars)
Carter  First Reagan  Second Reagan
Administration  Administration  Administration
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988e19 8 9e
Africa
a   .9  .8  1.0  .9  .9  .9  1.0  1.1  1.0  .8  .7  .7
Asiab  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.1  1.0
Latin  Americac  .6  .7  .7  .7  1.0  1.0  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2
Near  Eastd  2.7  3.1  2.7  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.4  5.2  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.3
Total  5.7  6.1  5.7  5.2  5.5  5.6  6.0  9 .2g  6.3  5.9  5.4  5.2
a.  Sub-Sahara  Africa,  including  the Sahel Development Program.
b. East Asia  and Southeast Asia;  also includes Europe, Eastern Europe,  and the
Developed  Countries.
c. Central and South America, Caribbean.
d. Middle East, Northern Africa, Turkey and Near East Regional.
e. Estimated.
f. Includes portion of  $6.1 billion economic and military aid package to  the Middle
East.
g. Includes $1 billion emergency economic aid transfer to  Israel, Egypt and Jordan.
Source:  Foreign Assistance  and Related Programs Appropriations  for  1988,  Hearings
before a Subcommittee of  the Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, 100th  Congress, First Session, AID Congressional  Presentation
Fiscal Year 1988,  February 1987  (Washington D.C.:  GPO,  1987);  see  Main Volume,
Part  II.TABLE  5  U.S Foreign Aid Obligations,  1978-1989, by Major Region
(as  a percentage of  total)
Carter  First  Reagan  Second  Reagan
Administration  Administration  Administration
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  988a1 9 89 a
Africa  15.8  13.1  17.5  17.3  16.4  16.1  16.7  12.0  15.9  13.6  14.6  14.6
Asia  26.3  24.6  22.8  21.1  20.0  19.6  20.0  15.2  22.2  22.0  21.8  21.8
Latin  America  10.5  11.5  12.3  13.5  18.2  17.9  23.3  16.3  22.2  22.0  21.8  21.8
Near  East  47.4  50.8b 4 7 .4  48.1  45.4  46.4  40.0  56 .5c  39.7  42.4  41.8  41.8
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
a. Estimated.
b. Includes  portion of  $6.1 billion  economic and military aid package to  the Middle
East.
c. Includes $1 billion emergency economic  aid transfer to  Israel, Egypt and Jordan.
Source:  Foreign Assistance  and Related Programs Appropriations  for  1988, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of  the Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, AID Congressional Presentation
Fiscal  Year  1988,  February  1987  (Washington  D.C.:  GPO,  1987);  see  Main  Volume,
Part  II.
The  Carter  administration  placed  great  emphasis  on  the  Middle  East
and  Latin  America.  In  its efforts  to  downplay  East-West  tensions,  the
administration sought smaller obligations  for Europe and the Asian
countries. 9  The Reagan administration continued support to  the Middle
East and further increased funds for Latin America.  The administration
intensified the cold war rhetoric  to  achieve large increases  in the total
foreign assistance budget.  Increases in assistance to Asia and to  the
developed countries of Europe were based on strengthening NATO allies and
base-right agreements with countries such as Spain and Portugal.10
Budget  Process.  The  U.S.  government  establishes  annual  budgets  for
foreign assistance;  the issues of how much to allocate and to whom are
10largely political and vary little from year to year  (e.g.,  Israel has
received $3 billion per year in total economic assistance from 1987-1989).
What varies from year to  year is  the issue of how the foreign assistance
will be used by recipients.  This issue  in the budgeting process generates
the most intense debates and rifts between executive and legislative
branches in the budget process.  Both branches  sometimes use the process
to manipulate the foreign assistance program to meet their particular
agendas.11
The budget process  is  "exceedingly complex and time consuming."12   It
begins in Washington with programming guidelines  that are sent to U.S.
field missions and then are returned to Washington in the form of
proposals written by the USAID missions and U.S. embassies.  At the
missions, the personnel (mainly Geographic officers and Development
Resource and Development Planning Personnel) develop Country Development
Strategy Statements  (CDSS) that lay out recommendations  for development
assistance, PL480,  and ESF;  the CDSS provide the framework for USAID
Planning.  The recommendations are reviewed in Washington, along with the
input collected from country ministers, consultants, and State Department
Officials, 13  and Project Identification Documents  (PID) are created.
These,  in turn, give rise  to  the Annual Budget Submission (ABS),  that
justifies  the funding needed to carry out the CDSS objectives.  The ABS
levels are established by State-USAID consultation based on a mix of
perceived security-development needs.  Regional Bureaus consolidate  the
data into an overall USAID-ABS that is  integrated, in turn with State
Department recommendations  for an overall package consisting of economic,
ESF, and security assistance  funds.
14
11At the  State Department, the mission proposals and recommendations
are routed to the Interagency Review Group, which is coordinated by the
Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology15  and
final budget recommendations are sent to  the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).  OMB reviews the budget and submits it to  the president for
review and recommendations.  When the president gives his approval, the
budget is printed and sent to Congress.
The Reagan administration sought to  manipulate the budget process at
the congressional level.  Traditionally, Congress first passes  the
authorization and then the appropriation for foreign assistance.  However,
during the first years of executive-legislative debates on foreign
assistance, the Reagan administration bypassed the usual process to move
foreign assistance directly through the appropriations process, thus
forcing aid into a continuing resolution.16
The executive branch achieved its  major objectives, mainly sharply
increased spending in selected areas, especially security assistance
programs, through continuing resolutions, while avoiding many
congressional conditions and limitations that would likely have been
attached to regular foreign assistance statutes, particularly
authorization measures.17
This strategy was very effective during the first administration
owing largely to William Schneider, Under Secretary for Security
Assistance,  Science and Technology.  He was  the State Department's top
foreign aid official and point man on the Hill for foreign assistance. 18
He knew how to work the system;  to bypass the authorization process  and
achieve  the administration's objectives he only had to  "lobby" the current
power base in appropriations:  Clarence D. Long (D-MD) and Jack K. Kemp  (R-
NY) in the House, and Robert W. Kasten (R-WI) and Daniel K. Inouye  (D-HW)
in the Senate. 19
12Kasten and Kemp supported the  administration's  objectives for  the
most part.  Inouye and Long finally agreed to  the proposals when the
administration "gave in" on the continued funding for development
assistance, principally, the International Development Association (IDA),
the World Bank agency specializing in low-interest  loans.  Inouye was a
strong supporter of IDA.  Long was perceived as a weaker person and,  thus,
not an obstacle  to  Schneider and the political pressure of the
administration.20
This system effectively increased spending and changed priorities
during the first administration but was not conducive  to new programs or
initiatives.  Nevertheless,  it  suited the needs of the administration.
More  important, the priority changes were achieved without modifications
to  the structure  of the foreign assistance act.21
During the second Reagan administration, the imposition of budget
restrictions and the election of a new chairman of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee for House Appropriations,  (David  Obey  (D-WI)),  in conjunction
with the lack of a new initiative  and policy design, severely hampered the
administration and sent it searching for ways to maintain a foreign
assistance program.  Now Congress no  longer supported security assistance
and clearly desired to maintain the development assistance budget.  The
administration, however, continued to  stress short-term political and
security needs over developmental needs.  The  result?  a series of
executive-legislative  confrontations that essentially stymied the entire
foreign assistance program  (see section on Congressional sources).
13Administration Sources
The White House and State Department, which are part of a president's
administration, establish foreign policy goals that affect the flow of
assistance.  Thus  in this section, we present our analysis of
administrative sources  in terms of the Carter administration and the two
subsequent Reagan administrations.
Whatever the time period, it can be argued that the administration is
most influential in formulating both foreign policy and foreign assistance
policy under the leadership of the president.  The success of any policy
provision is  reflected in the  inclusion of that provision in legislation.
The Carter Administration.  Like previous administrations  the Carter
administration commissioned a study of foreign assistance to develop an
effective strategy.  In October 1977,  the Development Coordinating
Committee (DCC;  an interagency task force comprising representatives of
the departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, OMB, and
National Security Council,  chaired by John Gilligan, director of USAID)
set the tone  for development assistance during the first years of the
Carter administration, by calling for a commitment to improve conditions
in poor countries  through economic  and technical assistance, multilateral
lending, and basic human needs.22  The DCC report was not planned to build
public support for  foreign assistance but, rather, to ascertain an
effective  approach  to  BHN. 23
Trying to  improve the implementation of BHN and, thus,  the
efficiency, effectiveness, and overall coordination of foreign assistance,
the administration reorganized of  the foreign assistance program under one
14umbrella organization:  the International Development Cooperation Agency
(IDCA).  Its main objective was  to  incorporate all economic assistance
programs scattered throughout the various Departments--State, Treasury,
Agriculture,  and others-into an independent agency24  and thereby give
foreign aid more political and bureaucratic clout.25
IDCA took over responsibility for USAID and for the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC;  a quasi-governmental agency providing
government-backed insurance and loan guarantees  for private investments  in
developing countries),  the funding and advising  of international
development agencies, and "partial responsibility" for the U.S. role  in
the MDBs. 26  The director of IDCA reported to both the President and the
Secretary of State, and was  the  "principal development adviser to  each."27
Some foreign aid officials hoped the  reorganization would give foreign aid
more political and bureaucratic clout.28
The establishment of IDCA also included the formation of the
Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC).  The latter
was to be set up to  improve the  technical side of U.S. foreign aid
programs in agricultural production, population planning, health, and
energy.  Essentially, ISTC was designed to take over the USAID research
programs  that supported BHN objectives.29
However well-intentioned the motivation to  establish IDCA and ISTC,
it  foundered on interagency bureaucratic politics.  IDCA may have been
formed, in part, to  counter a State Department move to acquire more
influence in program planning.3 0  USAID lobbied heavily for more autonomy,
while Henry Owen, White House special assistant for economic matters and
an "ally" of USAID, led the administration drive to  push IDCA through
15Congress. 31  IDCA, however, lacked the necessary power base  to change  the
foreign assistance bureaucracy.  The role the director of IDCA relative  to
the role of the administrator of USAID was unclear, so too was the chain
of command:  who was to report to whom and who had the final say on budget
matters.  Many congress persons  saw both IDCA and ISTC as just another
layer of bureaucracy surrounding the foreign assistance program.32
The proposed formation of IDCA came at the end of the Carter
administration.  It is  extremely difficult to establish an agency during
the transition to a new administration.  This certainly was  the case with
IDCA;  the conservative Reagan administration basically  "ignored" IDCA,
embedding it and USAID  (the same person was appointed director of IDCA and
administrator for USAID) in the State Department. 33  IDCA is  still  in
existence, but  in name only, and ISTC was never funded and thus,  not
established.
The Carter administration's major foreign policy initiatives that
influenced the foreign assistance program most were human rights and
North-South dialogue.  Regionally, the administration focused on the
Middle East and Latin America.
Critics argue that  the human rights  initiatives were flawed, given
that some countries received preferential treatment.  Foreign aid became a
tool to enforce human rights  in countries of little strategic importance,
whereas countries of greater political/strategic  significance to  the
United States were not subjected to  the same sanctions. 34  Also, many
policymakers viewed the North-South dialogue as counterproductive in the
pursuit of a  global balance of power.3 5
16At the regional level,  two treaties reflect the Carter foreign
policy:  the Panama Canal Treaty (1977) and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty  (Camp David Accords;  1979).36  The latter was  the last step  in the
revision of a U.S. assistance program that began in the middle 1970s.  Up
until 1973,  Israel and Egypt had received approximately $3 billion in U.S.
military and economic assistance.  They now receive that amount
annually. 37
The Panama Canal Treaty, had been negotiated almost exclusively by
Henry Kissinger.  It reflected the Carter administration's commitment to a
more positive relation with the countries of Latin America.  This
commitment was also reflected in the administration's response to  the
Nicaraguan revolution (1979) and in the  special draw-down authority that
funded El Salvador after civil war broke out there in 1980.  The
administration clashed with Congress over support for the newly formed
Sandinista government and resorted to  executive powers  to  assist El
Salvador.
These actions were symbolic of the  Carter relation with Congress  in
the  twilight of his administration.  Carter's foreign policy was
beleaguered by rising Soviet expansionism and economic crises  (both global
and domestic);  he gave  "lip service"  to healthy and productive relations
with the third world, but Congress was more concerned with inflation, the
Soviet Union and fiscal restraint.38  These concerns were behind the  the
foreign assistance program shift toward a more security-dominated,
bilateral program and the decline of the entire foreign assistance
budget.3 9
17What was most distinctive about  the foreign policy of the Carter
administration--idealist objectives,  tolerance of leftist
revolutionary nationalism, and relatively open decision making--
eroded as  conflicts with traditional security and economic concerns
emerged and as  the domestic political salience of those traditional
concerns became manifest.40
The First Reagan Administration.  The Reagan administration also
commissioned studies of foreign assistance but not until well into  its
second year.  The reason is  that the Reagan administration's  strategy for
foreign assistance policy had been planned in advance;  the studies were
commissioned, consequently, to  support rather than set the
administration's  ideological bent.  The Republican platform actually set
the tone for the Reagan approach to foreign assistance when it articulated
the shift from multilateral to  bilateral programs and from economic to
military and security accounts. 41
Robert Berg, then director of evaluation at USAID, described the
Reagan administration as knowing exactly what foreign assistance policies
to pursue before they occupied the White House.42  The transition team for
USAID was headed by Edward J. Feulner, Jr.,  president of the Heritage
Foundation, who opposed government-to-government assistance and favored
more bilateral  assistance programs in which U.S. economic  interests and
foreign policy objectives were dominant.43  He believed foreign assistance
programs created inefficient bureaucracies that hindered economic
development.  Feulner worked with the administration and M. Peter
McPherson, general counsel for the transition and USAID administrator
(1981 to 1986),  to  adopt policies  and programs consistent with this
view.  4
18Unlike the Carter administration, which publicly espoused BHN in
foreign assistance but actually shifted  to security concerns,  the Reagan
administration rhetoric  focused on security from the start.  The
administration denounced the Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies  and
labelled the Soviet presence as  the  underlying factor in the  "turmoil
which disturbs mankind around the world."45  Thus it  responded to Soviet
expansionism with a massive buildup of defense programs and then "declared
intent to respond firmly to  any Soviet move."46  The Reagan administration
sharply distinguished those who were friends  of the United States  from
those who were not.  Like the Carter administration, the Reagan
administration elected not to work with cumbersome international
bureaucracies  (MDBs and international organizations) but favored the more
manageable bilateral initiatives.47
The administration channeled funds,  for example,  to  friendly nations
regarded as  threatened by internal  (El Salvador, Sudan) or external forces
(Honduras, Pakistan),  and cut aid to  governments considered unfriendly,
uncooperative or mismanaged (Nicaragua,  Tanzania).4 8
The Reagan administration immediately embraced the ruling centrist
junta  in El Salvador.  The aid given for military purposes--"to repulse
leftists"--and economic purposes--"to help relieve social unrest"--was
administered by military advisers. 4 9  In the case of Pakistan, Reagan
sought warmer relations with President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq in hopes of
countering the  influence of the Soviet Union during the  1979 invasion of
Afghanistan.
5 0
We pointed out earlier that the administration resorted to  the
continuing resolution and manipulation of the budget process  in order to
19raise the levels of foreign assistance.  By targeting strategically
important countries with ESF funds and policy reform measures conducive to
privatization, the administration was able to satisfy conservative
opponents of foreign assistance.  With an overall  increase in the entire
budget and policy guidelines, which became known as  "four pillars,"  the
administration was able to  satisfy more liberal calls for BHN.
Most important, the administration achieved these ends
surreptitiously;  that is,  the foreign assistance act did not have to be
restructured because the four pillars were written into the existing
foreign assistance act in general policy language.  Hence the
administration could pursue programs  that fell under the definition of
either BHN or four pillars without having to  follow strict policy
guidelines.51
The four pillars  of development assistance were based on a memo
submitted by M. Peter McPherson during the presidential campaign in which
Reagan's ideas for  foreign assistance were outlined.  The four pillars
were designed to  "achieve the kind of foreign assistance program
envisioned by the President--one which seeks to foster self-sustaining
development by using initiative and creativity to help people help
themselves while at the same  time stimulating international trade and
aiding the truly needy."52
The four pillars  are
(1)  Policy Dialogue and Reform, seeking to agree with host country
governments on the policy constraints to  development and practical
improvements  that could be made;
20(2)  Institutional Development, focusing on decentralizing
institutions and encouraging reliance on private and voluntary, rather
than public, institutions;
(3)  Technology Transfer, seeking breakthroughs in such areas as
biomedical research, agriculture and family planning;  and
(4)  Private Sector Development, enhancing the role of  the private
sector  in solving development problems.53
The administration's  second Secretary of State, George Schultz,
expanded on the notion of foreign and U.S. national interests by setting
forth two basic premises for U.S. involvement in the Third World:
1.  there will be no enduring economic prosperity for our country
without economic growth in the Third World;  and
2.  there will not be security and peace for our citizens without
stability and peace in developing countries. 54
Schultz went on to say  that "Our security and economic assistance
programs are essential  instruments of our foreign policy and are directly
linked to the national security and economic well-being of the United
States."55
The crux, then, of the Reagan foreign assistance policy was how to
fit the rhetoric of the four pillars into  a foreign policy design that
secured U.S. national interests.  Many critics opposed the four pillars. 56
But  that does not negate the fact that the administration was  able to
achieve overall  increases in the foreign assistance budget.
In February 1983,  the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance
(the Carlucci  Commission) was appointed to  define the role of security
assistance vis-a-vis that of development assistance in U.S. foreign
21policy.57  The most prominent of its many recommendations was the
establishment of a Mutual Development and Security Administration.  The
Commission's conclusion was that "the most effective means to  achieve
program integration, a country approach to program development, an
improved evaluation system and increased public support  is  to consolidate
certain aspects of current programs under a new agency, reporting to  the
Secretary of State." 58  The new organization would be responsible for
integrating the economic  and security assistance programs. 5 9
The ultimate goal of the Commission was not only to show that foreign
assistance is  indeed an important foreign policy tool, but also  to
demonstrate "that in the absence of an effective security framework and a
sound macroeconomic policy environment, economic cooperation has
substantially reduced potential for positive long-term development
impact."60  The Commission concluded that all the  instruments of foreign
cooperation must be combined in  "sound, well-managed and integrated
programs, with consistent, coherent policy goals, or all  interests may
suffer."61
Critics  argue that the  "sound" advice of the Commission did not have
a major effect on policy  implementation, and that the Commission was only
a "rubber stamp" for a policy approach already underway in the
administration.62   Throughout the entire first Reagan administration,
economic and security assistance, at least at  the rhetorical level, were
being used to  achieve the same ends:  growth and stability.  This  link
between economic and security assistance was  the major reason for the
sharp  increase in the ESF account.
22The ESF was used extensively by the administration  for various
reasons.  Its  programs were relatively free of restrictions  (compared to
other aid categories),  funds could be disbursed very rapidly  to  countries
strapped by the world recession and rising debt crisis, and base-right
commitments could be expanded.  The administration's  emphasis on economic
reform and security lent itself nicely to  the cash'and budget support
transfers  of  ESF. 6 3
Two other  studies were commissioned during the first Reagan
administration.  At Treasury, Donald Regan and Barry Sprinkle, both
exceedingly skeptical  of a continuing U.S. commitment to  foreign
assistance, arranged for Professor Raymond F. Mikesell of the University
of Oregon to  study how developing countries might make the transition to
self-sustained development.  The narrow terms of the study's reference
disturbed USAID and the State Department officials.  When Treasury was
unwilling  to widen the scope, USAID and State commissioned its  own study
by Professors Anne O. Krueger and Vernon W. Ruttan of the University of
Minnesota  to  examine the development impact of economic assistance by.64
The Mikesell study was more supportive  of the aid effort than Regan
and Sprinkle had hoped.  The Krueger-Ruttan study, however, was more
critical, particularly of some "New Directions"  program efforts, than
USAID and State had anticipated.  It is  doubtful that either study had a
major impact on assistance policy.  Nevertheless, some agency personnel
argue  that the studies contributed to  a more informed and rational
interagency discussion of assistance policy. 6 5
The following outline of four program initiatives  illustrates the
ideological/political/strategic emphasis of the Reagan administration:
23(1) Private Sector Initiative.  This  initiative is  the best example
of the Reagan administration policy orientation:  the commitment "to
finding practical means of enhancing the private sector's role  in
assistance programs and in LDC development."66  The premise of the
initiative was  that
The most efficient allocation of scarce resources occurs when
individuals  seek to increase their incomes  in an environment
characterized by open competition in the supply and exchange  of goods
and services.  When complemented by prudent management of necessary
government services, the aggregate effect of individual free market
behavior is  growth and development of the economy at  large.67
This premise derived from the firm belief that developing countries
were overly hostile to reliance on market forces to guide  investment and
consumption decisions  and, hence, not using their resources  efficiently.
"LDCs which have overextended the role of the public sector and restricted
the operation of the private sector have experienced slow growth, heavy
budget deficits  and rising debt burdens."68  Here is  the heart of the
dramatic shift away from multilateral assistance  to bilateral assistance.
The resulting USAID policy was to engage  in "specific direct program
actions  to eliminate legal, regulatory and other constraints  to private
enterprise development, and to  assist and promote private enterprises."69
With multilateral assistance, USAID could not target specific enterprises
or political institutions;  furthermore,  the administration wanted to
influence the direction of MDB and international organization assistance
at every opportunity.
The private sector initiative was believed to be free of all
restrictions on form of assistance.  Development Assistance, ESF, and
PL480  loans or grants were seen as  "appropriate" devices  to support
private enterprise development.
70
24In 1983,  the President formed a task force to  develop guidelines  for
this private sector focus.  The task force, made  up of prominent business
persons or  "private sector leaders,"  was commissioned "to determine how
U.S. resources, particularly foreign assistance, could increase trade,
investment, and private enterprise in developing nations." 71  The
recommendations included the formation of an Economic Security Council to
coordinate domestic and international policy and increased emphasis,  "to
the maximum extent feasible,"  on channeling resources  to  the private
sectors  of developing nations and not to  governments.72
(2) Population Assistance  The Reagan administration ideology is most
evident  in its policy on population assistance.73  Since the  late 1960s,
the United States and some Western European and Asian nations had been
trying  to unify efforts to  limit fertility in the developing nations.  The
United States  supported the belief that unbridled population growth had an
adverse effect on economic development, health and individual potentials,
particularly among women;  therefore they favored family planning programs
to  reduce fertility and promote economic  growth.74
At the first World Population Conference  in Bucharest, August 1974,
the United States prompted the participants to  confront the issues of
population and its relation to development as  well as  consider population
policies and action. 75  The nations of the Third World, however, did not
concur with U.S. views.  They believed in a New International Economic
Order to  alleviate  the problems of population growth and argued that
"development is  the best contraceptive." 7 6
Nevertheless, by the 1980s  the Third World nations were accepting the
view that population growth threatened economic development while donor
25countries were  increasing efforts  at control.  By this time the United
States had altered its view.  At the Second International Conference on
Population in Mexico City  (1984),  the official U.S. position held
population to have a neutral effect on economic  growth; where the effects
were detrimental, they could be alleviated by rapid economic growth.77
James L. Buckley, head of the U.S. delegation to the conference in
Mexico, defined population growth as,  "neither good nor bad.  It becomes
an asset or problem in conjunction with other  factors, such as  economic
policy, social constraints, and the ability to put additional men and
women to useful work."7 8  The new U.S. strategy as outlined by Buckley was
to  remove subsidies and controls and rely "on the creativity of private
individuals working within a free economy." 79
Julian Simon, an economist at  the University of Maryland and an
intellectual standard-bearer  in the delegation, gained notoriety with his
work The Ultimate Resource,  in which he argued for population increases:
"the most important economic effect...is  the contribution of additional
people to our stock of useful knowledge."80
To further emphasize the break in policy, the preparation for the
Mexico conference did not follow standard procedure.  Instead of the  State
Department carrying out the planning and preparation, the White House
acted unilaterally to issue a position paper and form a delegation, which
became a source of conflict with State and USAID.81
Prior to  1984 the United States had channeled money for population
programs  through many international organizations.  Owing to criticisms
from the  "New Right" and other anti-abortion pressure groups,  support was
suspended for organizations that funded abortions,  (e.g.,  International
26Planned Parenthood Federation, IPPF;  and United Nations Fund for
Population Activities, UNFPA).82  The administration began withholding
funds from UNFPA and IPPF  in 1985.
The administration maintained rhetorical support for the population
program albeit in the context of  its position at the Mexico Conference and
of the view from the new right.  Thus, the budget requests for population
assistance program funds were  increased only slightly.  Congress expressed
its  disagreement by appropriating additional funds. 83  USAID Administrator
M. Peter McPherson mediated between the administration and the Congress  to
maintain a steady flow of  funds to  the population assistance programs.
(3) Regional Emphasis.  Four regions were designated to receive
special emphasis:  Central America, the Caribbean, the Middle East,  and
Africa.
Central America.  Aid to Central America increased seven-fold from
1980-1987.  USAID missions have significantly increased their staffs,
"becoming  what amounts  to  shadow governments  in some countries." 84  The
emphasis, however, was not so much on development as  on stabilization:
either  to destabilize the government of Nicaragua or  to stabilize the
regimes of the surrounding countries.  The ultimate goal was to
"reestablish uncontested U.S. political and economic hegemony in our own
backyard.  "85
The administration approach to  foreign aid in Central America was
based on "providing arms and cash to promote military access, counter-
insurgency and insurgency."
86  The major tool was ESF.  The Reagan
administration was accused of using U.S. veto power to block MDB loans  to
27some countries  throughout the region while forcing approval of loans to
other countries  that were  "favored in Washington."87
In hopes of generating a broad consensus of support for the Central
American program, the Reagan administration appointed a National
Bipartisan Commission on Central America (chaired by Henry Kissinger and
referred to as the Kissinger Commission).  The Commission found the roots
of the problems in poverty,  injustice, and stagnant economic  growth which
were both "indigenous and foreign.  Discontents are real,  and for much of
the population conditions of life are miserable..."  Hence the region was
"ripe for revolution.,88
The Commission endorsed the Reagan view of the turmoil in Central
America and of what should be done:  "substantial" increases in military
aid for El Salvador and "covert" aid to  the Contras  in Nicaragua.
Recommendations included long-term military and economic  aid for the
entire region, and a meeting between Reagan and Central American leaders
to plan the long-term economic development of the region.89
The Kissinger Commission had little effect on the aid policy but it
demonstrates the  importance placed by the administration on the region.90
After all, it was the Reagan Doctrine of supporting resistance movements
around the world that justified support for the Contras.  Congress,
however, was unwilling  to fund many of the President's policies--  the
growing caution of a Vietnam revisited--and was reluctant to  acquiesce to
the administration's policy of providing largely cash transfers.91
The Caribbean.  The administration's commitment to the Caribbean was
evident in the Caribbean Basin Initiative  (CBI).  Unveiled in March 1981
as  a plan to fuel the economies of the Caribbean and Central American
28nations and, thus,  to  "cool the  fire of revolution,"  CBI was supposed to
include a "quick injection" of  $350 million in economic aid in fiscal
1982,  to remove  trade barriers for most Caribbean products, and to  enact
tax incentives  for American businesses that would invest in the region.92
The economic  instability in the region was regarded by the
administration as a political threat to  the United States.  Thus  steps
were taken to  foster economic development.  They centered on the
diversification and expansion of production and exports, accomplished by
"several trade-related and tax-related incentives."9 3  Joseph Pelzman,
pointed out  that "the centerpiece of  the act was  the provision for
unilateral and nonreciprocal duty-free  treatment...for a wide range of
U.S.  imports from the region. 94
Critics, however, claimed that the problem with trade  in the region
was not tariffs but how to attract U.S. manufacturers away from Asia to
these labor surplus,  low income countries of the Caribbean:  "How to
provide the proper environment for the formation of the necessary
infrastructure,  the training of skilled workers, and the establishment of
internal markets..."9
The CBI rhetoric was directed to  the economic development of an area
of strategic  importance;  in fact, as  yet only  the  implementation of
selective trade agreements has occurred and they have made only marginal
improvements  in the region's economic progress.  Critics argue that even
these marginal  improvements have been offset by the losses created by U.S.
trade policy.
Africa.  The mix of foreign assistance objectives  in Africa  is
exceptionally confusing and contradictory.9 6 The objectives  include
29promoting the U.S. global geostrategic position, supporting U.S. positions
in multilateral forums and elsewhere,  insuring access of U.S. diplomats to
the many governments in Southern Africa, fostering economic  development
through financing projects or balance-of-payments  support conditioned on
policy reforms, and providing humanitarian relief.  If any administration
policy could be classified as  lacking design, the Africa policy would be
it.
During the first years  of the Reagan administration, Africa
benefitted from the overall  increase in overall foreign assistance
authorization.  The program placed a lot of stock in ESF to address  the
perceived policy reform needs of many African countries.  ESF offered the
necessary flexibility:  the kind not provided by normal development
assistance.  However, when foreign assistance was decreased in 1986,
funding for Africa was lowered and the short-term ESF transfers did not
generate a long-term development strategy.97
Many administration  initiatives  in Africa were criticized as
reactionary--simply responding to  crises--and as  ignoring long-range
planning.98  The  Sahel Development Program, for example, which originated
in President Ford's FY1978 foreign aid request, was designed to
institutionalize  the U.S. commitment to a coordinated, long-term,
multinational project to  support severely drought-affected West African
States;  it was never fully supported by the Reagan administration and thus
was stalled owing to  the lack of funding.99
The Reagan administration opposed most multilateral lending to
Africa. The administration believed U.S. funds should be used for
bilateral programs directed to policy objectives, such as promoting
30market-oriented activities and rewarding friendly nations.  The United
States could not control programs within the MDBs  (see following section
on multilateral assistance).1 00  U.S. contributions to  such organizations
as  IDA, a major lender  to Africa, the International Fund for Agricultural
Development  (IFAD),  and the African Development Fund were consistently
lower than those of other donor countries.101
The World Bank and other donors  (including many PVOs  in the United
States) took special  interest in African Development.  The consensus was
that Africa needed "plenty of aid."102   In 1984, participants in the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed a "special assistance
facility" for  the region but the administration opposed the special fund
in favor of bilateral activities.10 3
Other administration initiatives, such as  the Economic Policy
Initiative  (EPI),  a plan to provide aid to countries  that were willing to
promote changes  in their economic  systems or  to countries  that were
willing to promote growth through more capitalist-oriented free market
policies, met with little success  in Congress.  One Democratic House aide
expressed concern in Congress that EPI  "had become a slush fund to  reward
political allies.,
104
Most development experts agree that the many aid programs  for Africa
have not been very successful.
The basic reason for the failure  of these projects  is  their
inappropriateness  to African conditions.  They were too  complex,
requiring a degree of coordination by African bureaucracies that
would be difficult for any government.
10 5
An additional problem faced by the United States faced was how to
impose restrictions on the assistance when its  funds were but a fraction
of official development assistance for Africa.
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31Middle East.  Assistance to  the Middle East goes mainly to  Israel and
Egypt.  These two countries  account for well over 90 percent of the
foreign assistance to  the region;  ESF accounts for all the aid to Israel;
Egypt receives mainly ESF and a large amount of PL480.  Total development
assistance, as we have defined it,  accounts for approximately 2.5 percent
of the regional total.1 07
Assistance  to  the Middle East is both more basic and more complex
than that to other regions.1 08  It is  given mostly in terms of cash-grants
(ESF) with little oversight.  Inasmuch as  the region is wrought with
ethnic-political-religious upheaval, U.S. presence and influence  there
always will be  in check.
Prior to  the Reagan administration, assistance to  the Middle East was
directed largely  to bringing peace and stability.  The American people
accepted the Arab-Israeli peace initiatives  as  fundamental and supported
peace with increasing amounts of assistance.  This support, coupled with
the large Jewish population and successful Jewish lobby in the United
States, has led to a "closer" relation between the United States and
Israel.109
The Reagan administration built on this relation and elevated Israel
to the role of strategic  ally;  it began with the signing of a memorandum
on strategic cooperation in 1981.  The  first years of cooperation,
however, were beset by Israeli ventures into  the Golan Heights and
Lebanon.  They caused great strains  in the relation and cooperation was
even suspended for a  short period.  The administration ultimately realized
the importance of peaceful coexistence with Israel--the country, after
32all,  is  the only U.S. ally in the regionl0--and Israel realizes that the
country's  security depends greatly on the West.111
Strategic cooperation with Israel has since been formalized in a
"memorandum of understanding"  in which the United States and Israel
coordinate military and political planning, share intelligence, and
discuss  Israel's aid requests.  This  cooperation also affords the United
States with opportunities to  advise on economic policy.112  What is
lacking is  a cooperative effort to bring peace to  the Arab-Israeli
conflict which continues unchecked.
(4)  Multilateral Assistance.  Taking its  lead from the policy
established late in the Carter administration, the Reagan administration
was very skeptical of multilateral assistance.  This skepticism is best
exemplified by the  cuts  in the foreign aid program proposed by David
Stockman, director of OMB,  in 1981;  he  labeled them "deep cuts in foreign
economic aid on the basis of pure ideological principle."11 3  The
principle was to  give bilateral assistance precedence over multilateral
assistance and security assistance took precedence over development
assistance.  Only ESF received "lenient treatment."l 14
Stockman and others, particularly Donald Regan and Barry Sprinkle at
Treasury, believed the many international organizations, including USAID,
to be  "infested with socialist error."115
The international aid bureaucracy was  turning Third World countries
into quagmires of self-imposed inefficiency and burying them beneath
mountainous external debts they would never be able to  pay.116
In the spring of 1981,  the administration commissioned an interagency
review of the MDBs, chaired by the Treasury Department.  The purpose was
to provide a  "comprehensive and dispassionate examination of the  [MDBs],
33and by applying the administration's basic policy preferences and
priorities to the findings,  to establish a policy and budgetary framework
for U.S. participation in these institutions  in the 1980s." 117  Although
the study listed nineteen criticisms of the MDBs, ranging from staff
salaries to  systems of project evaluation, it  supported MDB lending in
general and advocated political impartiality by lending institutions. 11 8
The U.S. foreign assistance undertaking, however, sought more
political support  for the private sector and for those specific sectors
that could influence  the success  of USAID projects. 119  MDBs cover broad
areas  of policy that may undermine U.S. bilateral efforts or foreign
policy objectives;  thus much of the administration's anti-MDB sentiment
centered on this potential threat and on Robert McNamara's BHN rhetoric.
Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank from 1968 to  1981, had
used BHN to elevate  the rhetoric  of lending institutions and to devote
bank funds to  the poorest of the poor.1 20  Opponents on the right
criticized the bank for promoting socialism.121
Robert Clausen, a Carter appointee, succeeded McNamara as president
of the World Bank in 1981 and attempted to  change its  rhetoric.  He
claimed that the banks programs favored the private sector and political
and institutional adjustment, which could be interpreted as an attempt to
gain Congressional support for funds,  given the claim's similarity to  the
rhetoric of the Reagan administration.1 22
The administration, however, "successfully" cut funds to the World
Bank and other multilateral lending institutions;  the only multilateral
program that escaped major cuts was the controversial IDA.123  Earlier we
noted that the IDA commitment was necessary to the administration to
34satisfy liberal calls for a more BHN-oriented approach to  assistance.
Criticisms  of IDA centered on low-interest loans  as basically gifts and
their  ineffectiveness  as an instrument  of U.S.  influence abroad.124
By the end of the first Reagan term, the initial U.S. pledges  to  MDBs
had been cut by more than 30 percent.  All the banks--the Asian
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African
Development Bank--were all affected.
The belief is widespread belief in the development community that the
banks  provided much of the intellectual force behind development
assistance strategies in the  1980s.  The administration, however, de-
emphasized the role of the MDBs, which could be interpreted as a sign of
the  importance given to  development by the administration.125  Critics of
the administration contend that the policies of alleviating poverty were
"sacrificed to  the Washington ideology."126
The reservations in regard to  the U.N. and international
organizations center on budgets.  McPherson testified that "there has been
a tendency for budgetary increases in some of these programs to outstrip
donor interest and financial support, and in some programs there has been
a resulting thinness or lack of focus." 127  The administration habitually
proposed cutting contributions to most U.N. specialized agencies;  the most
drastic  cut was made to  funds  for the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).128
The administration announced its  intention to withdraw from UNESCO in
December 1983.  A  State Department document accused UNESCO of not
adequately reflecting the view of minority groups within the
institution.1 2 9 UNESCO showed "endemic hostility" toward free  society
35institutions--free press, open markets, and human rights--and displayed
widespread mismanagement or  "excessive budget growth."130
The administration appointed a commission to study UNESCO and its
response to the administration's criticisms.  Since no satisfactory change
in UNESCO operations was found, the United States withdrew in 1984.
However, the United States still has "observer status"  at UNESCO and makes
voluntary contributions  to  "selected international scientific or cultural
activities in UNESCOs field of competence considered important to  U.S.
interests."
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These Reagan administration initiatives  demonstrate a definite  shift
away from the BHN philosophy toward a more short-term security orientation
centered on macroeconomic  growth.  The  shift generated considerable
controversy among traditional aid constituencies.132  Perhaps Larry
Nowels, a specialist in foreign affairs, said it best:
The new directions  legislation, which calls for aid directly to  the
poor remains on the books, but the thrust of the Reagan
administration's  four pillars  is  toward macroeconomic growth.  The
question of the extent to which aid resources should focus on
promoting growth through reliance on the private sector and market
mechanisms  as opposed to  strengthening the resources of the poorest
population remains a key issue for debate.133
The Second Reagan Administration.  During the second Reagan
administration, the central focus of foreign assistance  shifted again.
Where the  first Reagan administration was characterized by increased
bilateral economic and security assistance, the second Reagan
administration was characterized by an increased sense of international
cooperation and lower levels of assistance.  The Realpolitik of the Reagan
36administration suddenly took on properties of the idealist doctrine of
foreign policy.134
A major shift, at least at the rhetorical level, moved U.S. policy
from security to economic stabilization and growth.  U.S.-Soviet relations
were improving dramatically and the outlook for future cooperation was
good.  The U.S. economy could no longer support--in a political sense--the
increases of earlier foreign assistance budgets;  hence policymakers
questioned the efficacy of an assistance program  "dominated by military
1,135 and short-term security concerns. 135
John Sewell and Christine Contee  (Overseas Development Council)
argued that four major factors were involved in this  shift.
(1)  The U.S. has been transformed from a creditor nation to a debtor
nation.
(2)  The U.S. global  trading position shifted (the United States
experienced unprecedented trade deficits).
(3) The commercial banking system became  internationalized, that is,
the health of the U.S. banking community was dependent on the ability of
foreign banks  to repay loans.
(4) The "political stake of this country  [U.S.]  in broad-based growth
and development in key countries  such as  Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and the
Philippines is  increasing as  these countries liberalize both their
economic and political systems."1 36
For Reagan's second term, James Baker III  traded jobs with Donald
Regan and became  Secretary of  the Treasury;  he set out  to work with
international lending institutions  to provide the impetus  for developing
countries to  "grow" their way out of their economic crises.  Baker
37understood the urgency of resolving the deteriorating world economic
situation which was being attributed to  the domestic policies  of
Reaganomics.137
Just as Kennedy had turned the cold war security concerns of the
Eisenhower administration to  increased concerns with development
assistance and aid, so James Baker turned the concerns with global debt
into concerns with  international cooperation.  The argument was that the
United States could assist developing countries  to restore growth and
resolve debt problems  that, in turn, would benefit the economic and
political interests of the United States.  This  line of reasoning was
instrumental in changing the administration's view of MDBs.13 8  Baker
believed that the United States, along with the banks, could bolster third
world development by promoting the use of structural adjustment lending
and maintaining tighter surveillance of economic  indicators within
borrower nations.  Baker was  an adamant supporter of free trade.139
His most notable initiative was  the Baker Plan, an international debt
strategy based on loans of $20 billion in new monies from commercial banks
and $9 billion in loans from the World Bank and other multilateral
development banks to debtor nations.  The plan hinged on the borrowers'
"reforming" their economic systems  to become more market-oriented
(adopting growth-oriented macroeconomic and structural policies like those
of the International Monetary Fund).  Implicit in the plan was World Bank
oversight  responsibility.
The Baker Plan, however, was essentially unsuccessful.  Commercial
banks were unwilling to provide  the necessary capital and the economic
"reforms" were  too ambitious  for many politicians in the borrowing
38countries.  In addition, critics claimed that the World Bank mandate was
never specified.14 0
This  sense of international cooperation during the second Reagan
administration intensified with the reversal in sentiment toward the
Soviet Union.14 1  The warming in East-West relations brought about an
atmosphere of optimism.  However, the sense  of international cooperation
and optimism forced greater scrutiny of the security assistance budget and
increased the development orientation in the entire  foreign assistance
budget.  No longer could massive defense buildups be justified solely on
the basis of countering Soviet insurgency.
The major difference in the  subsequent foreign assistance strategy
was curbing the sharp increase  in security assistance and relying even
more heavily on private  sector initiatives, market mechanisms, and private
voluntary organizations.  The diminishing funds also meant that Congress
had greater effect on the flow of assistance  (via earmarks) and on the
administration's  flexibility in achieving foreign policy goals.  That is,
because of ESF earmarks and the lack of funds,  the Middle East, Central
America and base-right countries had a virtual monopoly on the account.142
Nevertheless, other programs were not completely neglected.  For
example,  in 1987 the administration proposed--and Congress supported--the
initiation of the Development Fund for Africa,14 3  a fund within the
development assistance program that provided a flexible source of aid for
policy reform and balance-of-payments  support.  Congress  earmarked $500
million for the fund exclusively under a Continuing Resolution  (HJ Res
395)  .144
39The U.S. relation with the U.N. also changed.  In September 1988,  the
Reagan administration reversed its eight-year feud and authorized the
release  of $44 million in outstanding U.N. dues and "signalled a
willingness to  release an additional $144 million in dues to be
appropriated by Congress  for the next fiscal year."145   It was an apparent
reaction to the decline  in anti-western sentiment in the U.N. under
Secretary Perez de Cuellar.146
In addition, the administration asked the State Department to "work
out"  a multiyear plan for distributing another $520 million in past debts
to the U.N. and specialized agencies, such as the World Health
Organization ($28 million) and the Food and Agriculture Organization  ($82
million).147
USAID Sources
USAID has gone  through three major changes in the last fifteen years.
BHN was the first change.  It was made under the "centralized" agency
system of Daniel Parker and John Murphy.  New Directions legislation
altered USAID objectives  to a concentration on more project orientation as
opposed to the centralized programming procedures of the 1960s.  At the
same time, Congress became more active and began to  restrict USAID
activities.  Functional budgeting, earmarking and additional reporting
requirements subjected USAID to Congressional micro-management.148
The second change came in 1978 under the direction of John Gilligan.
He appointed the Babb Commission in 1977  to study USAID's organizational
structure.  The Babb recommendation led Gilligan to modify the centralized
40agency format in favor of a more decentralized structure;  the latter seen
as  a more effective means of  implementing New Directions  legislation.149
Decentralization entailed increasing the number of people in the
field, placing more authority in the hands of regional bureaus, and
organizing smaller central bureaus.  Inasmuch as New Directions was
targeted at poor and small--mostly rural--projects, the Babb Commission
also  recommended the formation of a Rural Support Bureau and a new Bureau
for Private and Development Cooperation with responsibility  for
"encouraging increased participation of private and non-governmental
institutions."150
Because of the nature of BHN, USAID shifted away from operational
responsibilities  to planning and financing projects that other groups
implemented, but USAID monitored and evaluated.151  The arguments  for this
shift were based on the lack, in many recipient countries, of skilled
middle level managers who were capable of carrying out development
projects.  The  BHN projects often were technical in nature and outside  the
expertise  of USAID staff members and country management.  It  led to
recipient countries and USAID staff members working together  to  identify
the contractors needed to  carry out projects.152
The  effect of this  situation was  that the administration and USAID
formed coalitions of special  interest groups and key members of Congress
to pass legislation.  It  also expanded the USAID/Washington bureaucracy
because officials were forced to  diagnose the Washington "policy climate"
and to package programs  to  fit a particular goal, product, or service, or
a specific  region.1 5 3  This  "dependence" on interest groups and Congress
led to many restrictions on amendments to USAID funding and shifts  in
41regional focus and policy;  more important, it reinforced Congressional
mistrust of USAID and the administration's intentions. 154  Thus USAID
became an extremely complex and bureaucratic organization.
The third reorganization came  in 1979 under William Bennett when he
succeeded Gilligan as administrator.  Bennett continued the
decentralization policies of Gilligan but commenced the necessary
procedures to move USAID from the State Department to the International
Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA).155  Bennett also  is  credited with
strengthening the Office of Evaluation.
Toward the end of the Carter administration, concern grew with the
limits of the BHN approach to development assistance;  hence policy reform
and dialogue were recognized as  important elements of assistance strategy.
Critics claim that BHN was interpreted too narrowly and did not allow for
the changing needs of recipient countries arising from the changing global
economic environment, that  "the  success of individual developmental
efforts  is  as much a function of the overall  set of economic policies that
induce individual decisions as  it  is of the sound design of individual
projects."156  Critics also were quick to point out  the slow-moving USAID
bureaucracy which BHN had created.157
The Reagan administration was strongly committed to moving away from
the BHN orientation and streamlining the aid process.  Acting quickly and
decisively, it placed IDCA and USAID firmly within the State Department
and implemented strategies and policies congruent with the Four Pillars.
The ideological standard-bearer  for USAID and the administration was John
Bolton, Deputy for Program and Policy Coordination.  He moved rapidly to
develop a set of new policy papers outlining rather specifically, sector
42by sector, and program by program, the new USAID approach to  economic
development.158  The policy papers,  the "blueprint" for USAID, codified
systematically a broad range of decisions.  They were designed to make a
lasting impression on the USAID decision-making apparatus and to
institutionalize  the change  in direction proposed by the Reagan
administration.159
It must be emphasized that these policy papers were only part of the
larger drive to bring USAID into line with the Reagan administration's
philosophical thrust.  Other roles were played by the State Department,
OMB, Treasury, and the administration itself.  USAID was very much a part
of the administration's overall foreign policy strategy and, consequently,
subject to  the budget allocations dictated by the administration and
State, and to  the political pressures  of Congress and special  interest
groups.
M. Peter McPherson, USAID Administrator and, subsequently, director
of IDCA, was more sympathetic to  the BHN objectives than was the
administration.  Although he coordinated the USAID program with the
programs of the State Department, he was willing to resist administration
pressures and to blur the difference between development assistance and
strategic concerns.  He  also was  able to  "hold the  center" against
pressures from proponents of the  "social agenda" to  cripple USAID's
contribution to,  for example, family planning.160
McPherson had acquired development experience as a Peace Corps
volunteer  in Peru.  Later, he became a lawyer and served on the White
House legal  staffs of Nixon and Ford.  Prior to  the  1980 election he was
deputy to  E. Pendleton James, Personnel Director  for the White House;
43later, both men became members of the Reagan transition team.161
McPherson believed that  the enunciation of the Four Pillars of development
assistance was a major contribution of USAID.162  He stressed mainly the
private sector approach to aid, the focus on policy reform, and the
transfer of technology.
In efforts  to  increase agency efficiency, McPherson continued the
decentralization measures begun by Bennett and strengthened the system of
evaluation and information gathering.163  USAID was given the authority to
"deobligate" funds from projects that are  "lagging" and to  "reobligate"
them to other projects. 164  In addition, McPherson emphasized project
implementation as opposed to  the more bureaucratic-laden project design.
He accomplished this emphasis  largely by increasing reliance on
nonproject-type assistance in which assistance was linked to policy
reforms and structural adjustment.165
In keeping with the Four Pillars and the use of nonproject
assistance, USAID established the new Bureau for Private  Enterprise.  It
was headed by Elise R. W. du Pont, a lawyer and wife of then-Governor
Pierre S. (Pete) du Pont  (DE).  She had very little development
experience.  The bureau defined its policy as  fostering "the growth of
productive, self-sustaining income and job-producing private sectors in
developing countries using the financial, technological and management
expertise of the U.S. private sector, indigenous  resources, multilateral
institutions and agency resources where appropriate."l 66
The bureau kept the historic USAID perspective by focusing most of
its efforts on agricultural projects.  It was willing to  "go one  step
further,"  however, and to help to finance agribusiness projects as well as
44intermediate financial  institutions, "such as  private development funds
and venture capital  firms,  that will operate  in the developing world."167
By 1986, McPherson commented, "the concept of private-enterprise
development...permeated our  entire program,"168 as  in, for example, the
advances of private sector development in the area of health services.  In
Bangladesh, "contraceptives reached the people much faster through the
private sector  than they would have done through the government.  The same
is  true with a variety of other health programs,  such as  the distribution
of packets for oral-rehydration therapy."1 69
Other areas  that were emphasized by the Bureau for Private Enterprise
were privatization (through the AID-funded Center for Privatization) and
financial market and institutional development, which provided credit for
people and organizations previously unable  to  obtain credit.  The Bureau
also worked through the International Executive Service Corps  (IESC)  to
provide technical assistance to  the private  sectors of recipient
countries.  The USAID participant training programs  added an emphasis on
private sector assistance, especially business management training.170
McPherson commended the program's  operations in 1986.  "Probably the
biggest  single  change in the way we have run the program in the last 5
years has been the increased focus  on policies." 171  Currently, USAID  is
putting increased emphasis on "transitional assistance"--assistance to
reform economic  and political institutions  that are regarded as a
hindrance to  development.172
USAID gave increasing responsibility to the Private Voluntary
Organizations  (PVOs);  they are active participants in development and
relief activities overseas and are associated with grass-roots, people-to-
45people programs. 173  In the Policy Paper on PVOs,  the first objective
listed is  "to increase the economic development impact of PVO programs
through increased program integration and focusing resources  on field
programs."1 74  PVOs treat  the more project-oriented objectives of
assistance which allows USAID  to concentrate on more macroeconomic
concerns.175
During the Reagan administration, USAID was forced to be more
responsive to the needs of U.S. foreign policy than to the needs of the
developing countries.  A major preoccupation of  the administration was
using USAID programming effectively in order to achieve foreign policy
objectives, but success was limited because McPherson was committed to
maintaining the humanitarian and development objectives of the agency.
The work of McPherson, along with some members of Congress and special
interest groups, especially the humanitarian PVOs, enabled the agency to
resist many of the more radical reforms on the Reagan administration
agenda.
Despite attempts  to create a more efficient and focused agency, USAID
was subjected to many diverse and often conflicting needs of the
administration, Congress, and special interest groups.  As a result, USAID
became a slow-moving bureaucracy intent on juggling the needs of the
administration and the Congress with those of developing countries. 176
Congressional Sources
During the 1970s,  Congress took the initiative in implementing
programs and developing new strategies in foreign assistance.  The
initiatives were begun during the Carter administration when BHN
46legislation was in its  initial stages, but they stalled somewhat in the
Reagan administration.
During the Carter administration, the major Congressional initiative
was the creation of the International Development Cooperation Agency
(IDCA); however,  it collapsed of its own political weight.  Congress
subjected the Carter assistance packages  to many "across the board"
spending cuts.  Indeed, Carter often complained of being unable to
administer his aid program effectively because of intense Congressional
oversight.177  When Carter took office he had pledged to double foreign
aid by 1982178 but he was balked by the rise of Soviet expansionism, the
Iran affair, the Nicaraguan revolution, and the domestic economic crisis.
Congress became very disillusioned with the Carter foreign policy and with
the  foreign  assistance  effort.
What the Carter administration lacked in executive power, the Reagan
administration made up for  it  in popularity and the ability to push bills
through Congress.  The major Congressional role during the  first Reagan
administration was to  influence policy via amendments and earmarks.  The
role  is most evident in the dialogue between Congress and the Executive
over priorities:  The administration dramatically increased security
assistance and ESF whereas  Congress favored more economic-oriented
programs but initiated no major foreign assistance strategies.  Mainly
Congress acquiesced to  Executive initiatives  and then earmarked and
appropriated funds under continuing resolutions  largely within the design
of the administration.1 7 9
According to Rep. David R. Obey  (D-WI), current Chairman of the
Foreign Operations and Export Financing Subcommittee of the House
47Appropriations Committee, it was "the  lack of support for aid and the  lack
of consensus on how foreign aid should be used [that]  prevented Congress
from passing a freestanding appropriations bill."1 80
Congress made  some efforts  to  remedy the lack of Congressional input
in foreign assistance and to take more initiative  in legislation.  In a
major policy shift,  the House and Senate, in 1981, agreed to a proposal by
Clement Zablocki  (D-WI), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
to make aid authorizations good for two years.  Zablocki  argued that  it
would be beneficial not to have to debate and vote on politically
unpopular foreign assistance programs every year, and especially during
election years. 181
Both the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees  initiated
major  legislative provisions to maintain oversight of the foreign
assistance programs.  The Reagan administration, in turn, sought to bypass
the Congressional restrictions by the use of reprogramming and "emergency
powers" (e.g.,  providing military assistance to  El Salvador). 182
The Senate committee's unprecedented response was to earmark the
entire ESF account.  Both the House and Senate committees also rejected
the administration's  efforts to limit the sanctity of Congressional
earmarks, and they voted to give themselves reprogramming veto power,
power previously limited to appropriations committees.1 83
Then, in 1983,  an amendment  (presented by Senator Paul Sarbanes  (D-
MD),  Senate Foreign Relations Committee) was enacted to  shift funds from
the Military Assistance Program  (MAP) and ESF accounts into development
aid programs;  the United Nations Development Program was a direct
beneficiary.1 8 4 Sarbanes said it was "important for the committee to
48establish the proposition that we ought to be moving in this
direction.,185
Nevertheless, the  first Reagan administration was able  to  increase
the foreign assistance budget and to  pursue  its policy of a security-
dominated assistance effort.  During the  second administration, however,
budget constraints and ensuing disagreements between Congress and the
administration over foreign assistance priorities brought about major
decreases in overall spending.  The most serious funding cut resulted from
the  Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, written by Senators
Phil Gramm (R-TX), Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Ernest Hollings  (D-SC).186
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (G-R-H) was to  balance the budget by
1993.  Thus  it set annual ceilings on the budget deficit.  In the event  of
a deficit exceeding the set  limit, the  act mandates automatic reductions--
sequestration--in federal spending.  According to  Obey, the act has had a
"major influence on congressional spending decisions."187
Obey became chairman of  the Foreign Operations and Export Financing
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee  in 1985.  This
committee, which controls  foreign aid spending, had accumulated much power
in the absence of Congressional authorization bills by the Foreign Affairs
Committee.  An out-spoken critic of  the Reagan administration and its
emphasis on security over development assistance, Obey believed that under
Reagan the aid program was a "short-term put-out-the-fire program."188
Obey was critical not only of  the administration's approach to
assistance but, also, of G-R-H.  When the bill passed despite his efforts,
Obey made a commitment to  its principles and tried to hold the
administration to  the budget limits.  The administration, however,
49continued to ask for large increases in the foreign assistance budget as
if G-R-H had never happened.  A political battle ensued between Obey and
the administration in which the foreign assistance budget was a pawn.
Larry Nowels referred to  one interesting example as the  "Manila
Meltdown."  Just months after passage of G-R-H the adm'inistration
requested a 15%  increase in the FY1987 foreign assistance budget.
Instead, Obey cut  the budget by the required G-R-H guidelines.  Secretary
of State Schultz, who was in Manila at the time, returned as soon as he
heard that his budget was slashed and began a massive campaign to generate
public support for foreign assistance, but to no avail.  Nowels pointed
out  that had the administration's request been more reasonable, perhaps
the budget would not have been decreased so dramatically.1 89
According to  Nowels, Obey held foreign assistance hostage to  lower
defense spending and increase revenues  (i.e.,  increased taxes).  Carol
Lancaster argued that Obey, probably the most  influential person on the
Hill  in terms  of foreign assistance, used his political acumen and ability
to build coalitions to hold put the administration's security efforts  in
check.  He called for a broad-based approach to  foreign assistance and
more attention to  international debt, environmental concerns, and BHN.190
Since the  first year of G-R-H and the hotly contested foreign
assistance funding debate,  foreign assistance has been part of the overall
Budget Summit arrangement which sets ceilings  for all categories of the
U.S. government.  The foreign assistance budget has been maintained at
levels even higher than expected because of compromises reached with
federal spending, taxes and deficit reduction.1 9 1
50The budget austerity measures  extended to  funds  for U.N. agencies.
The most important measure was  the Kassebaum Amendment  (Section 143 of
Pubic Law 99-93).  It went into  effect in fiscal year 1987 and restricts
U.S.  funding of U.N. organizations to under 20 percent of their annual
budgets until these organizations  "adopt voting rights on budgetary
matters proportionate  to  the contributions of each member state."' 92
Funds are also witheld from U.N. activities benefitting the  Palestine
Liberation Organization  (PLO) or the South West Africa Peoples'
Organization  (SWAPO).  The estimated total effect of these reductions  is
only around $1 million.193   Foreign assistance funding shortfalls,
combined with Congressional earmarks and oversight, greatly hinder the
flexibility of the foreign assistance program.194  Even when Congress
brings bills to  fruition, however, partisan differences and declining
funds create difficulties.  Recently, Congress tried to  alter the
priorities  (e.g.,  Child Survival Act and Global Poverty Reduction Act) of
the foreign assistance program in hopes  of building a more bipartisan base
of support for assistance.195
Earmarking and micromanagement are products  of a policy that is not
well-defined in objectives or goals.  Hence a task force, headed by Reps.
Lee Hamilton (D-IN) and Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), was formed to  study
foreign assistance and to provide direction for rewriting the Act.  The
purpose was to  find workable solutions  to  the many problems complicating
the foreign assistance legislation of  the last decade.  The task force
concluded that "foreign assistance  is vital  to promoting U.S. foreign
policy and domestic  interests, but...the program is hamstrung by too many
51conflicting objectives, legislative conditions, earmarks, and bureaucratic
red tape."
196
External and Societal Sources
With global interdependence on the rise, the United States  is more
sensitive  to uncertainties in international relations.  Interdependence
also has  increased the awareness of the U.S. population to  the world
around them.
External Sources.  Many external sources that led to New Directions
legislation  (e.g.,  the legacy of Vietnam and the economic rise of the
Third World) affected policy makers  in the  late 1970s and early 1980s.
The two dominant sources throughout the  1980s were  the international debt
crisis and the rise of conservatism.
The underpinnings of the debt crisis began in the early 1970s when
the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries  (OPEC) quadrupled oil prices.
This rise,  in conjunction with many other factors,197  culminated in
Mexico's devaluating its  currency in 1982 and the  "official" commencement
of the global debt crisis.
The U.S. foreign assistance policy has been greatly affected by the
global economic situation:  The United States recognized the growing
economic  interdependence of the global economy, the effect of its  domestic
policies, and the impact of debt on the development and security of
developing countries.198  The major  impact of the debt crisis, however, is
evident in the sharp decline of private financial flows  to developing
countries.  Doubtful credit worthiness and sound fiscal management have
52kept private funds  out of debtor nations and severely hampered their
prospects  for growth.199
Because of the sharp decrease in private  flows,  the second Reagan
administration abandoned some of its private  sector rhetoric  and supported
public sector involvement in financial markets.  Specifically, the Reagan
administration (1) contained much of its hostility toward MDBs;  (2)
intervened in the management prerogatives of commercial banks on how much
they should lend to  developing countries;  and (3) worked with Congress to
increase the authority of regulatory agencies that oversee international
banking.200
The global  economic crisis brought the United States back to  the
realm of global economic cooperation, which foreign assistance translated
into a new focus on structural adjustment and policy dialogue.  This  focus
also played a role in warming U.S.-Soviet relations and led to  the Soviet
withdrawal from past overtly expansionist policies  and to  the articulation
of Glasnost and Perestroika.
The  rise of conservatism is best described by George Will:
Liberalism is political astronomy--anachronistic astronomy, unaware
that even the planets  do more wobbling and wandering and banging
about  than the eighteenth century thought.  Conservatism is  political
biology.  It emphasizes the indeterminateness,  the complexity of
things, and the  fact that there  is more to  a social system than meets
the eye. 201
"Conservative thinking,"  wrote Gregg Easterbrook in The Atlantic,
"has not only claimed the  presidency;  it has spread throughout our
political and intellectual life and stands poised to become the dominant
strain in American public policy."
2 0 2  He  cited the  growing number of
conservative think tanks and other  "noteworthy" public policy groups  that
are swaying policymakers.
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53The conservative thinkers in the Reagan administration by and large
were products of  (or destined for) the Heritage Foundation;  it  is well
known for its opposition to  the foreign assistance program.  In 1981,
Edward Feulner, president of the Foundation, argued that
Aid is  neither a necessary or a sufficient condition for economic
development.  Foreign assistance  too often encourages wrong
attitudes, wrong developments.  It tends  to be from government to
government:  the most able,  skilled individuals in third world
countries generally end up working for government instead of the
private sector.  It ends up reinforcing government as opposed to
private structures.204
The Heritage Foundation takes positions that are  opposed to  the
mainstream of "post World War II  internationalism."205  Feulner, who
headed the USAID transition team for the Reagan administration, believed
that IDCA should be abolished, Food for Peace cut back substantially, and
MDBs de-emphasized.  He supported the trade and development program, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation  (OPIC), and increased use of
PVOs.206
Societal Sources.  Public opinion and the work of special interest
groups  are the focus of this section.  The  first is examined polls
conducted by Christine Contee, John Reilly and Frank Ballance. 207
The results of Contee's study show that Americans in general believe
development issues and relations with LDCs are  less  important than
domestic issues.  A majority, however, endorse U.S. assistance programs
that center mainly on humanitarian concerns and a "sense of
responsibility."208  Another  interesting finding is  that public opinion
and U.S. policy show major differences in key areas;  for example, in the
area of economic assistance, the public shows a preference for development
assistance.  Yet during the Reagan Administration the ESF account received
54the largest funding increases.  The public seems not to understand the
political intricacies  of formulating assistance programs.
In response to a question on the United States as a world leader
which "should set an example for other wealthy nations by helping other
poor nations,"  78 percent agreed.  Yet the United States is  ranked last
among DAC countries Official  Development Assistance as  a percentage of
GNP.209
In general, all three public opinion studies came  to  the same
conclusion:  that for most Americans  domestic concerns  should take
precedence over international concerns.  The  studies also indicate the
presence of great differences among the views of political leaders,  the
administration, and the public. 210
Furthermore, the studies found that the decline  in national interest
toward U.S. participation in world affairs continued until 1982.  In that
year, the respondents  showed increased interest in a more active role for
the nation in world affairs.211  It may be concluded that public opinion
influenced the administration's rising concern with global economic
cooperation at the outset of the  international debt crisis.  However,
public opinion seems  to have had little effect on the flow of financial
assistance;  in fact, "people-to-people, poverty-oriented aid was
considered more effective by the public."  The administration's  focus,
nevertheless, was on security and growth.212
The rise  in public awareness and sentiment toward humanitarian
assistance, coupled with the administration's emphasis on macroeconomic
concerns, may have been at  the heart of  increased involvement of the PVOs.
It can also be argued that the BHN initiatives of the  1970s created their
55own special interest groups;  the emphasis on the rural poor drew many
church and service-oriented PVOs  into the realm of third world
development. 213
We mentioned in the section on USAID sources  that the agency sought a
closer relation with the PVOs;  and the PVOs reciprocated with increased
support  of the development assistance effort.  They formed networks that
reached millions of Americans to  inform them of the assistance effort.
Leaders  of PVOs testified before Congressional committees, met with USAID
officials,  and were able  to mobilize wide-spread support.214  However,
given the increased demands  for charitable contributions,  the roles of AID
and the PVOs began moving closer and closer together.215
Many members of the PVO community see this movement as a threat to
their autonomy.  Bishop Broderick of Albany, then Executive Director of
Catholic Relief Services, commented in 1983,  "we do not want to  look like
the tool or fool of  the United States Government."216  Some PVOs--notably
OXFAM--refused government funding for the very reason that they do not
want to be associated with the administration's policies. 217
Larry Minear labelled the relation between USAID and the PVOs as
"politicized."218   He cited the increased amount of funding available  to
the PVOs and the ESF resources that was "provided within a more explicitly
political context."219  Minear claimed that even though PVOs were able to
extend the reach of U.S. development assistance, it was because  the United
States had become "less  guided by humanitarian imperatives,...the
independence of PVO collaborators is  at a greater risk."
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Other interest groups playing a significant role in shaping the
administration's  assistance policy were the environmental groups,  the
56agricultural interests,  including BIFAD and the universities, and the
"geographic" lobbies, especially the American-Israel  Public Affairs
Committee. 221
Historically, universities have been greatly involved  in agricultural
research on behalf of developing countries 222  but their influence appears
to have undergone a decline.  The Board for International Food and
Agricultural Development (BIFAD) institutionalized the program, giving
strong support to USAID and a voice to  the university system.223  The
conservative voice of  the administration, however, may have circumvented
the role of universities  in developing its approach to  assistance. 224
Israel's special  interest representative on Capitol Hill is  the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee  (AIPAC).  Some attribute the
"strategic partnership" of the United States and Israel to AIPAC.  It
claims  large, sustained, perennial levels of funding.  Other countries
tried to  emulate the AIPAC model  in garnering support for foreign
assistance.  The more successful have been Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and
recently, Ireland.
The most intriguing interest movements to have influenced policy are
the environmental and agricultural groups.  Historically, agriculture
lobbies worked to  sustain the level of subsidies and to  "protect" our
"competitive advantage"  in agriculture.225  The environmentalists, not too
long ago, were labelled  "a luxury of the rich."226   Currently, however,
both groups have been working toward the  same goal:  sustainable
development.
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Although some agricultural organizations prefer that the United
States not engage in the transfer of agricultural technology and support,
57many agricultural groups have realized that  "accelerated development in
the developing countries  is desirable and feasible, '228 and that economic
development can be fostered through  the transfer of technologies,
training, and research, for the benefit of all.
The environmentalists believe  that "poverty itself pollutes  the
environment.  Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their
immediate environment in order  to  survive."229   Such groups as World
Resources Institute,  the Natural Resources Defense Fund, and the Sierra
Club actively lobby Congress and publish material on environmental
degradation and development.  They also have successfully generated
grassroots  support.
Both environmental and agricultural groups have found that by
coordinating their efforts, they can generate  support for development
assistance programs that are environmentally sound, sustainable, and
directed toward poverty alleviation and resource management.230  John W.
Mellor referred to this goal as  "breaking the cycle" of a cause and effect
relation of poverty and environmental degradation.231
Intellectual Sources
The ideological perspective of  the Reagan administration brought to
the fore conservative critics of the foreign assistance program.  This
forced the critics from the left to continue  to make their points, albeit
with little impact.  The effort by mainstream academics, or  students, of
foreign assistance was to  recapture the center.
Development theory from the right, in its pure form, can be
characterized as the belief that assistance hinders  the growth and
58development of recipient countries.  "As a form of intervention channelled
to  recipient governments,  [assistance]  is  said to  frustrate the free
operation of the market, to  distort the price system, and to  impede
private-sector development."232
The Reagan administration adopted what was essentially a centrist
version of conservative or rightist views of development assistance.  The
centrist view is based on a firm belief  in the magic of the marketplace,
nondistorted prices, and private enterprise, which enable recipient
countries  "to achieve sustained and accelerated development on their
own."233
The beliefs of the right are  "rooted in the theory of perfect
competition and central  theorems of welfare economics and equilibrium
analysis."234   The most quoted critics of foreign assistance are Bauer and
Yamey who see foreign aid as  "the source of the North-South conflict, not
its  solution,"235  and  who  believe that
Economic achievement has depended, as  is still does depend, on
people's own faculties, motivations, and ways of life, on their
institutions and on their rulers.  In short, economic achievement
depends on the conduct of people, including governments.  External
donations have not been necessary for the development of any country
anywhere. 236
Bauer and Yamey argue  that aid inhibits the development process by
making governments more powerful and more apt to pursue policies  that
retard growth.  The  right also argues  that when foreign aid is  given, it
should be  to governments whose economic policies are  likely to promote
general welfare and economic progress;  relief aid should be given through
PVOs;  and free  trade is a means  to  further development. 2 3 7  The Heritage
Foundation transmitted this message to  the administration.
59Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute  for Public
Policy Research is  a defender of the right that supports the  liberal
international economic order.238  He argued for U.S. development
assistance programs that support the promotion of policy reform,
competence in administration, and acting on opportunities afforded by
international markets in goods, services, and finance.239
The right, including the Heritage Foundation, currently espouses  the
ideas of Hernando de Soto.  De Soto supports the idea that  the problem in
third world countries  is  the state, not the  informal economy or black
market.  Inefficient government bureaucracies stymie peasants' creativity
and entrepreneurial genius leaving the poor majority at  the mercy of the
established upper class minority.240
Oddly enough, the right has been supported in this  "anti-aid" view by
the left;  both are anti-statist.  Where de Soto emphasized the peasant
entrepreneur, the left emphasizes the peasant community leader who
organizes people to  fight against the ruling class.  In  its purest sense,
the left holds that in a donor-recipient relationship, "the interplay of
power and economic interests prevents  them [the  recipient governments]
from utilizing the aid provided in a manner conducive to poverty
alleviation in their countries...,"  that is,  rich countries use poor
countries only to further their own objectives.21
Among the better known critics on the left are such writers as
Frances Moore Lappe'  and Teresa Hayter and such organizations as  the
Development GAP.2 4 2  The  left compromises two categories:  the
institutional pessimists and the structural theorists.  Both concentrate
on the interplay between economics  and power and on how institutions
60impede the effectiveness of assistance;  the structural theorists, however,
are more global in their analysis.24 3  Though not popular as  they were
during the  1960s,  the left has been gaining support since the mid-1980s.
Critics from the left generate support for their ideas through
grassroot and community-based lobby groups.  GAP is very influential  in,
for example, Bread for the World and Results;  and Frances Moore Lappe'  is
co-founder of the Institute for Food and Development Policy, a not-for-
profit research and educational center that promotes food and justice
issues around the world.  The  influence of these groups stems from  their
ability to motivate  the people concerned with these  issues.
Riddell pointed in his study to  the weakness in the theoretical
structure of both right and left arguments and to  the need for  "retaking
the middle ground."244   He demonstrated that many studies of foreign
assistance and of the causal  relation of assistance and growth have been
flawed because of data problems and methodology.245  He argued for the
middle ground, not on the basis  that assistance  is necessary or  sufficient
for development but that assistance  is an effective  tool in the
development process.
This sentiment  is widespread in current development assistance
thought and it  is  taking root in the setting of  foreign assistance policy,
such as  the emphasis  on structural adjustment and policy reform.  It could
be argued that  the  theme of  the  foreign assistance debate was  in defense
of the middle ground:  the relation in recipient countries between aid and
domestic savings  and between aid and economic growth performance.
24 6
Supporting the retaking the center are the studies by Mikesell,
Krueger and Ruttan, Cassan, and others.  They focus on the Krueger and
61Ruttan argument that  "official flows on commercial terms could hardly
reduce world welfare."247   These arguments, however, are contingent on the
need for institutional development and policy reform to  sustain
investment and productivity.248  Other proponents of the middle, such as
Tony Killick, warn readers of the  "impending decline of market solutions"
and argue  for a more balanced approach to development assistance. 24 9
The extent to which any of these groups influence foreign assistance
policy  is contingent on their capacity to influence key decision makers.
Because the first Reagan administration was successful in  implementing
initiatives,  the right was very influential.  The second administration
found Congress  increasing its  role in setting assistance policy;  indeed,
the policies show the influence of the middle and left lobbyists.2 50
Conclusion
Some of the many influences  that have shaped U.S. foreign assistance
debate over the last  15 years are outlined in this paper.  Two distinct
shifts in assistance policy are  identified:  (1) the move away from BHN
toward more security-domination and (2) the move away from security toward
a policy incorporating some of  the ideas of economic  cooperation and
internationalism.
The  sources have been both foreign and domestic.  The  shift away from
BHN, for example,  reflects the changing needs of developing countries  and
the  failure of the BHN approach to successfully address many elements
essential to the development process:  the growth of economic capacity and
the policy environment needed to  assure economic growth.  This  shift was
strengthened by the cold war rhetoric of the Reagan administration and its
62determination to  achieve closer linkages between economic  and security
objectives.
The  shift toward global economic cooperation was motivated by the
international debt crisis and the recognition of  the need for increased
economic  interdependence.  The domestic economy's slow growth and the
burden of exceptionally high budget deficits resulted in Congress's
increased reluctance  to sustain foreign economic assistance.  Both the
Congress and the development community were increasingly critical of a
policy that allocated assistance resources primarily to meet short-term
political and strategic objectives rather than long-term development
needs.  Congressional concerns with the politicization of the  aid
program were voiced by David Obey as  chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Appropriations.  He was successful  in restraining and then reversing the
allocation of resources to  the economic support fund.
During the 1980s,  USAID lost much of its  capacity to influence the
direction of the  foreign assistance program because its  initiatives were
more administrative than substantive.  By the early 1980s,  intellectual
leadership on development issues, particularly policy reform, had been
assumed by the World Bank;  and leadership in the resolution of the world
debt crisis  shifted to  Treasury and the  International Monetary Fund.  The
State Department was extremely influential  in the allocation of assistance
resources and in determining the  size of the economic support fund
relative  to  the development assistance budget.  USAID was forced into a
running battle with its domestic critics on the right and into  a rear-
guard battle  to protect its budgetary discretion against contractors and
clients.
63The evolution of program assistance has been more a product of
bureaucratic  and Congressional politics  than of administrative
initiatives.  What is perhaps most surprising is that USAID and the U.S.
assistance program were not more badly damaged.  The reason, in
substantial measure, is  the fact that the  ideologies of the right were
unable to follow up on their  initial successes  in reordering agency policy
with a new policy focus capable of capturing the  imagination of the
Congress and the aid bureaucracy.
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